The main characteristic of a mobile ad-hoc network is its infrastructure-less, highly dynamic topology, which is subject to malicious traffic analysis. Malicious intermediate nodes in wireless mobile ad-hoc networks are a threat concerning security as well as anonymity of exchanged information. To protect anonymity and achieve security of nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks, an anonymous on-demand routing protocol, termed RIOMO, is proposed. For this purpose, pseudo IDs of the nodes are generated considering Pairing-based Cryptography. Nodes can generate their own pseudo IDs independently. As a result RIOMO reduces pseudo IDs maintenance costs. Only trust-worthy nodes are allowed to take part in routing to discover a route. To ensure trustiness each node has to make authentication to its neighbors through an anonymous authentication process. Thus RIOMO safely communicates between nodes without disclosing node identities; it also provides different desirable anonymous properties such as identity privacy, location privacy, route anonymity, and robustness against several attacks.
Introduction
Conventional wireless mobile communications are normally supported by a fixed wire/wireless infrastructure. A mobile device would use a single-hop wireless radio communication to access a fixed base-station that connect it to the wire/wireless infrastructure. In contrast, ad-hoc networks do not use any fixed infrastructure. The nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network intercommunicate via single-hop and multi-hop paths in a peer-to-peer fashion. Intermediate nodes between a pair of communicating nodes act as a routers [1] . Thus the nodes operate both as hosts and routers. The nodes in the ad-hoc network could be potentially mobile, and so the creation of routing paths is affected by the addition and deletion of nodes. The topology of the network may change randomly, rapidly, and unexpectedly [1] .
Mobile ad hoc networks, MANETs, are finding ever-increasing applications in both military and civilian systems owing to their self-configuration and self-maintenance capabilities. Collaborative computing and communications in smaller areas (building organizations, conference, etc.) can set up using as-hoc networking technologies [1] . Communications in battlefields and disaster recovery are other examples of application environments. Many of these applications, such as military battlefield operations, homelandsecurity scenarios, law enforcement, and rescue missions are security sensitive. As a result, security in MANETs has recently been drawing much attention [2] .
Traffic analysis is one of the most subtle and unsolved security attacks against MANETs. By definition, it is an attack such that an adversary observes network traffic and infers sensitive information of the applications and/or the underlying system [3] . Sensitive information includes the identities of communicating parties, network traffic patterns [2] , and their changes. The leakage of such information is often devastating in security-sensitive scenarios. For example, an unexpected change of the traffic pattern
Related Work and Our Contributions
The proposed protocol RIOMO is exclusively based on the pairing-based cryptographic properties. There is also another approach of anonymous communication based on pairing-based cryptography proposed by Zhang et al., [11] , called MASK. In MASK, system administrator generates a large set of pseudo IDs for every node. So, in MASK, every node has a fixed pseudo ID set and it should large enough set, otherwise there is a chance of finding pseudonym linking by the intruders as a result anonymity decrease and it fails to full-fill its target. If the pseudo ID set for a node is small then anonymity property lose of the MASK protocol, because every node has to repeat its pseudo IDs after finishing one round of all its pseudo IDs. Thus pseudo IDs work as real IDs and intruders able to identify each node. So, to keep strong anonymity in MASK, every node should have to manage an extremely large enough number of pseudo IDs set provided by the system administrator, which is costly for ad-hoc network communication in terms of extra task for nodes, IDs maintenance. In this paper we explicitly show that; by using only one pseudo ID taking from system administrator, nodes can generate their own pseudo IDs independently and dynamically. It is the first approach to achieve anonymity by using only one pseudo ID taking from the system administrator in ad-hoc network. With pairing based IBE properties and random number nodes can generate their own pseudo IDs dynamically, which also provide strong security properties.
There are some other proposals [12, 13, 14, 15] taking care of privacy. In [12] , a secure dynamic distributed routing algorithm (denoted as SDDR in this paper) for ad hoc wireless networks is proposed based on the onion routing protocol [13] . The anonymity-related properties achieved in this algorithm include weak location privacy and route anonymity. However, it ignores one important part of privacy in mobile ad-hoc networks, namely identity anonymity, and it cannot provide strong location privacy.
In [14] , Kong et al. design an Anonymous On-Demand Routing (ANODR) based on topology. Similar to Hordes [15] , ANODR also applies multicast/broadcast to improve recipient anonymity. ANODR is an ondemand protocol, and is based on trapdoor information in the broadcast. These features are not discussed in regards to Hordes' [15] multicast mechanism.
Compared to [12] , ANODR gives a more comprehensive analysis of the anonymity and security properties achieved, and provide detailed simulation results. In addition, ANODR is more efficient than SDDR at the data-transmission stage. However, similar to SDDR in [12] , ANODR does not provide identity anonymity and strong location privacy. RIOMO and other two protocols are described in Table 1 and in Table 2 with respect to the Anonymity-related properties and security-related properties respectively. Detailed discussions of these properties are given in Section 5. One of the major challenges in ad hoc networks security is that ad hoc networks typically lack of a fixed infrastructure both in form of physical infrastructure such as routers, servers and stable communication links and in the form of an organizational or administrative infrastructure [16] . Another difficulty lies in the highly dynamic nature of ad hoc networks since new nodes can join and leave the network at any time. The major problem in providing security services in such infrastructure-less networks lies on how to manage the cryptographic keys that are needed. When designing protocols for ad hoc networks, whether routing protocols or security protocols, it is important to consider the characteristics of the network and realize that there are many "flavours" of ad hoc networks. Ad hoc wireless networks generally have the following characteristics [17] : Dynamic network topology: The network nodes are mobile and thus the topology of the network may change frequently. Nodes may move around within the network, the network can be partitioned into multiple smaller networks or be merged with other networks.
Limited bandwidth: The use of wireless communication typically implies a lower bandwidth than that of traditional networks. This may limit the number and size of messages sent during protocol execution.
Energy constrained nodes: Nodes in ad hoc networks will most often rely on batteries as their power source. The use of computationally complex algorithms may not be possible. This also exposes the nodes to a new type of denial of service attack, the sleep deprivation torture attack [17] that aims at depleting the nodes energy source.
Limited physical security: The use of wireless communication and the exposure of the network nodes increase the possibility of attacks against the network. Due to the mobility of the nodes the risk of them being physically compromised by theft, loss or other means will probably be greater than that for traditional network nodes. In many cases the nodes of ad hoc network may also have limited CPU performance and memory, e.g. low-end devices such as PDA's, cellular phones and embedded devices. As a result certain algorithms that are computationally or memory expensive might not be applicable.
Bilinear maps
Let G 1 an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same prime order q. Let P be an arbitrary generator of G 1 . (aP denotes P added to itself a times). Assume that discrete logarithm (DL) problem is hard in both G 1 and G 2 . We can think G 1 as a group of points on an elliptic curve over , and G q F 2 as a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field for some . A mapping ẽ:
, satisfying the following properties is called a cryptographic bilinear map.
• Bilinearity: ẽ(aP, bQ) = ẽ (P,Q) ab for all P,Q Є G 1 and a, b Є Z q * . This can be restated in the following way. For P, Q, R Є G 1 
, ẽ (P+Q, R) = ẽ (P,R) ẽ (Q,R) and ẽ (P, Q+R) = ẽ (P,Q) ẽ (P,R).
• Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G 1 , then ẽ(P,P) is a generator of G 2 . In other words, ẽ(P,P)≠1.
• Computable: A mapping is efficiently computable if ẽ(P,P) can be computed in polynomial-time for all P, Q Є G 1 . Modified Weil Pairing [18] and Tate Pairing [19, 20] are examples of cryptographic bilinear maps.
Diffie-Hellman Problems
With the group G 1 described in section 2.2, we can define the following hard cryptographic problem applicable to our proposed scheme.
− Groups where the CDH problem is hard but DDH problem is easy are called GAP Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups. Details about GDH groups can be found in [21, 22, 23] .
RIOMO Architecture and Design
In RIOMO, system administrator does not take part in routing rather it has the following tasks during the boot strap of the network.
• µ mapping from arbitrary-length strings to µ-bit fixed length output.
• Generates system's secret ώ Є Z q * , where Z q * = {y | 1≤ y ≤ q-1}. Any one in the network does not know ώ except system administrator. System administrator also uses this secret to generate the secret point of the non-adversary nodes. Thus the system parameters <G 1 , G 2 , g, H 1 , H 2 > are known to the non-adversary nodes. System administrator also provides the following parameters for nodes, regarding their IDs and secret points.
• Provides each node, a secret point SP R , with respect to the node's real ID ID R , which is defined as SP R = ώ H 1 (ID R ). The Source and the destination use their corresponding secret point in the route discovery phase to authenticate each other. For a given set of <ID R , SP R > no one can determine the system secret ώ as we discussed in section 2.3.
• Provides each node a different pseudo ID IDP i , and their corresponding secret point SPP i , which is defined as SPP i =ώH 1 (IDP i ); if i≠j then IDP i ≠ IDP j as well as SPP i ≠ SPP j . For a given set of <IDP i , SPP i > also no one can determine the system secret ώ. With the above information any node can generate its own pseudo IDs and the corresponding secret points randomly in every session in communication. Let's check for node k; k has received its pseudo ID IDP k and the corresponding secret point SPP k =ώH 1 (IDP k ) from the system administrator. So, k can generate its own pseudo ID ID Pk =R k H 1 (IDP k ), and the corresponding secret point SP Pk =R k SPP k =R k ώH 1 (IDP k )= ώR k H 1 (IDP k )=ώID Pk where R k is a random generated by k; this equation also holds the previous cited property in section 2 that no one can determine the system secret ώ for a given set of pseudo ID and the corresponding secret point , <ID Pk , SP Pk >. Thus a node can generate its own pseudo IDs and corresponding secret points as its need.
RIOMO Protocol

Anonymous Neighbor Authentication
When a node wants to join in the network or moves to a new place, it has to authenticate within its neighbor nodes. Say, Alice has received her pseudo ID IDP A , and the corresponding secret point SPP A =ώH 1 (IDP A ), i.e., <IDP A , SPP A > from the system administrator. She can join in the network by authenticating within her neighbor nodes or if she moves another place in the network different from her current place, she also needs to authenticate her within her neighbor. To avoid an attack, if Alice wants to change her pseudo ID different from her current pseudo ID without moving her place, she also needs to authenticate her current pseudo ID within her neighbor. For this purpose she generates pseudo ID ID PA =R A H 1 (IDP A ), corresponding secret point SP PA = R A SPP A = R A ώ H 1 (IDP A )= ώ R A H 1 (IDP A )=ώ ID PA , where R A is a random generated by Alice; she also generates a random R RA which is used to generate verification codes Ver 0 * and Ver 1 . Alice broadcasts her pseudo ID ID PA , and a random R RA within her neighbor region. One of her neighbor, let's say Bob, makes a response with his pseudo ID ID PB , generated random R RB and verification code Ver 0 as shown in fig.1 . If Alice is a valid node then Ver 0 *=Ver 0 , and Ver1 * =Ver 1 thus she can be a member and she is identified as ID PA , within her neighbor. Thus Alice and Bob use their session key K AB =K BA corresponding their pseudo IDs ID PA , ID PB , respectively. No one within Alice's neighbor can recognize her as Alice because she is using her pseudo ID and she is changing her pseudo ID time to time. Thus the nodes can hide their IDs in the network and always seem new to each other. Any adversary node can not be a member within its neighbor, because it has to pass the verification code "? (Ver1*= Ver1)" which is not possible to generate without the knowledge of the system secret. Similar way all nodes in the network can authenticate anonymously within their neighbors and generate their corresponding session key. Thus nodes in the network maintain their neighbor table with their pseudo IDs and corresponding session key. Fig. 1 . Anonymous neighbor authentication process for two neighbor nodes "Alice" and "Bob"
Control Packets
RIMIO uses route request packet RRQ, and route reply packet RRP, to find a route in the network. To discover a route and to receive a response it uses RRQ and RRP respectively.
RRQ
ID PSE : Sender pseudo ID ID PSE , it is the pseudo ID of the current sender. When sender broadcasts a RRQ packet it puts its own pseudo ID in this field. Thus ID PSE ≠ ID S , but when the source is a sender then ID PSE =ID PSO ≠ID S , here ID S is the source's real ID and ID PSO is the source's pseudo ID which we discussed in section 3.1.
RRQSeqNO: Route request sequence number is used for identifying each route-request and corresponding route-reply packet from each other. It is generated by the source uniquely when source wants to communicate with a destination. RRSeqNO= H(ID PSO ||Time), where, H is a collision resistant hash function, ID PSO is a pseudo ID of the source, and Time is the calendar time when source generates RRQ packet. This field remains unchanged for the corresponding RRP generated by the destination.
ID S : Source's ID ID S , it is the source's real ID. Source generates a route request packet and puts its real ID in this field, and pseudo ID ID PSO , in ID PSE field, thus ID PSE =ID PSO but ID PSE ≠ID S . This is used by the destination to make a sign in route reply packet. ID PRE : Receiver's pseudo ID; on the path from the destination to the source when RRP packet travels ID RPE defines the next node who receives RRP packet.
Sign D : Destination's Sign; when destination replies to source through intermediate nodes, it generates a sign, so that no one can forge. Sign D = H 2 (K DS || RRQSeqNO), where K DS is a session key between the source and the destination generated by the destination and defined as K DS = g(ώH 1 (ID D ),H 1 (ID S )) =g (H 1 (ID D ),H 1 (ID S )) ώ . Destination also uses its session key K DS , to decrypt data, sent by the source encrypted with source's session key K SD , where K SD = g (ώH 1 (ID S ),H 1 (ID D )) =g(H 1 (ID S ),H 1 (ID D )) ώ .
Route Discovery and Route Reply
On route discovery and route response phase the nodes maintain their corresponding table. When a node receives a RRQ packet it broadcasts within its neighbor and when it receives a RRP packet, it sends the RRP corresponding to the receiver. RIOMO is described in terms of its functionalities which are described below.
Route Discovery
Every node in the network maintains its neighbor table with their pseudo IDs and corresponding session keys. When a source wants to communicate with a destination it generates a RRQ and broadcasts this RRQ within its neighbor to find a route, thus RIOMO is an on-demand routing protocol. By receiving a RRQ, a node checks ID D and RRQSeqNO, of the RRQ and makes the following decisions:
• If the node is the destination i.e., ID D matches with its real ID then it do the following tasks:
• It keeps < RRQSeqNO, ID PSE > in its routing table; this ID PSE becomes ID PRE for RRP, generated by the destination. By replacing destination's own pseudo ID in the ID PSE field of RRQ, it broadcasts RRQ, within its neighbor. The purpose of this extra broadcast is to make attackers fool.
• It generates a RRP with its own pseudo ID ID PSE , receiver's pseudo ID ID PRE already discussed above, makes a sign Sign D discussed in section 4.2 and sends to the receiver. Notice that RRQSeqNO will be unchanged.
• If the node is not the destination and RRQSeqNO. is new, it keeps RRQSeqNO, corresponding pseudo ID ID PSE in its routing table, this information <RRQSeqNO, ID PSE > is used by the node in the route reply procedure; this ID PSE becomes a receiver pseudo ID ID PRE in the route reply procedure. The node becomes a new sender and it puts its own pseudo ID in the ID PSE field of the RRQ and this RRQ within its region.
Route Reply
It is just a reverse path traverse of a RRP explored by a RRQ. When a RRQ reaches to the destination it generates a RRP and forwards it in the reverse path as we discussed above. If a node receives a RRP, it checks RRQSeqNO in its routing 
Anonymity Achievement and Security Analysis
When an RRQ and RRP travel from node to, every node generates a large bit random sequence corresponding to the fields of RRQ and RRP. By extracting random bits from the fields of the packets, every node pads their own random bit sequence, and replaces their own pseudo IDs to the ID PSE accordingly. Thus the packets appear new when it moves from node to node. Also the fields (except ID PSE , ID PRE ) are encrypted with corresponding session keys, thus it is also protected from intruders.
Identity Privacy:
In RIOMO the identities of the nodes are represented by their pseudo IDs which are changed by the nodes in each session of communication. Pseudo IDs are also generated by using random numbers, hash functions as we discussed in section 3, also the control packets are encrypted so no one can recognize who is actual source and/or destination in a route request, route reply phase. Thus identity privacy of nodes is achieved in the network.
Location Privacy:
If there is extra information added to control packets when the packets are forwarded form node to node; by observing the route request and the route response packets an attacker can estimation about the distance between the source and the destination. Thus, an attacker can set an attack regarding location privacy. In our scheme, nodes do not know anything about the locations and identities of the other nodes in the network. So, no nodes in the network can determine the distance from them to the source and to the destination; they also do not know about the starting point of a packet traveling in the network. Only in a session the nodes know pseudo IDs of its neighbor region. Thus RIOMO ensures location privacy.
Route Anonymity: Current attacks on route anonymity are based on traffic analysis [24] . The general theory behind these kinds' of attacks is to trace or to find a path in which packets are moving. For these purpose the malicious nodes mainly looks for common information which are not changing in a packet during movements of control packets. As a result, the adversaries can find or to estimate the route from source to the destination. In RIOMO all the control packets appear new (Fig.2) to the network, when it travels form node to node. Because every time random bits are extracted and padded during movements of the control packets as we discussed at the beginning of this section. Thus route anonymity is achieved of a path. 
DoS:
According to the target of attack, multiple adversaries can co-operate or one adversary with enough power can target to a specific node to exhaust the resource of the node. For this purpose the adversaries try to identify a node and set a target to that specific node. In RIOMO identity privacy is achieved; so one can identify a node make a target to attack. Thus DoS can be protected.
Wormhole Attacks: In wormhole attack an attacker records a packet in one location of the network and sends it to another location making a tunnel [25] between the attacker's nodes, later packet is retransmitted to the network under its control. Thus there could be a long distance travel for a packet to find a route from the source to the destination. In RIOMO an attacker can not be a trusted member within its neighbor so it can not be an intermediate node in route discovery or route reply phase thus an attacker can not take part in the routing. So the affect of the wormhole attack is not effective in AODPR.
Rushing Attack: By using the tunnel of wormhole attack an attacker can introduce rushing attack to rush packets. Existing on-demand routing protocol, such as AODV [7] , DSR [8] , LAR [26] , Ariadne [27] , SAODV [28] , ARAN [29] and SRP [30] , suffers from rushing attack. We discussed that RIOMO can prevent wormhole attack so rushing attack is not effective in this protocol.
Conclusions and Future Works
Anonymity is one of the important characteristics in securing a mobile ad-hoc network routing. In this paper an anonymous on-demand routing protocol, called RIOMO for preventing passive attacks, is proposed. In this protocol nodes take only one pseudo ID from system administrator and generate their own pseudo IDs for anonymous communications. Thus pseudo IDs maintenance cost is reduced compare to the existing protocol. Moreover RIOMO ensures node privacy, route anonymity and location privacy and is robust against several known attacks. Comparison analysis and security properties are described. As a further research we plan to make simulation with different criteria of performance analysis as well as implementation in a specific environment.
